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Entrepreneurship and Development: 
an Alternative Perspective 
CIARAN McCULLAGH* 
University College, Cork 
Abstract: This paper offers an alternative to the more orthodox psychological approach to the study 
of entrepreneurship. It suggests that an adequate theory of entrepreneurship must consider a country's 
political and economic history and especially the way in which this history has structured the oppor­
tunities for economic gain open to social groups in the society. It further suggests that due to the 
different historical experience of underdeveloped countries, and especially international monopoly 
capital, these opportunities will be differently structured in such societies. Whilst the particular 
structure may not lead to development, it will be maintained by the class structure and political 
system which emerges in such societies and which may resist attempts to alter that particular structure 
of economic opportunities. However, while such opportunities are so structured, analysis of entre­
preneurship must also consider why there might be differential response to such opportunities in a 
society. This, it suggests, can be explained in terms of the degree of role continuity and congruity 
in economic roles in the society. Consideration of both the historical and the economic role level 
is essential for the study of entrepreneurship. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Within the modernisation perspective on development, the study of entrepreneurship has been of central importance. Here, Greenfield 
and Striken (1981, p. 481) tell us, "entrepreneurial studies have sought 
the sociological and/or psychological characteristics of the type, or pheno-
*This article benefited from the comments of Jim Flanagan of the University of Pennsylvania on an 
earlier version. 
menon, called the entrepreneur". Such studies are epitomised by the work of 
McClelland (1961) and, to a lesser extent, that of Hagen (1962). Although 
this perspective was developed in the 1960s it has remained remarkably 
resilient. Recent examples include Jacobowitz and Vidler (1982), Pendey 
and Tewary (1979), Vincentew (1979) and Teikmer (1980). Yet none of 
this work addresses or attempts to deal with the range of criticisms that 
have been made of this overall approach. The approach, it has been argued, 
fails to consider the concrete historical circumstances in which entrepreneurs 
emerge and in which they act (see for example, Frank, 1971). I t attributes 
too much independence of action to the individual entrepreneur and so 
fails to examine how in Cardoso's (quoted in Kahl 1976, p. J^45) words 
"the structural conditions of society in general limit and characterize the 
possible forms of innovative behaviour in the economic field" (see also 
Long, 1977, p. 142). 
This essay is an attempt to move away from that tradition and to suggest 
an approach to the study of entrepreneur ship in developing and under­
developed countries which, following Long's advice (ibid, p. 142) gives 
"consideration to the various frameworks within which entrepreneurs 
operate. These frameworks constitute the basic parameters within which 
entrepreneurial activities and decisions occur". The important frameworks 
to consider are the economic and political histories of particular countries, 
with their independent and decisive influence on the level of overall possi 
bilities for indigeneous entrepreneurial activity. For developing and under­
developed societies these possibilities are structured by the international 
economic environment and power structure. Our main contention is that 
the problem of entrepreneurship can most fruitfully be approached by 
focusing on how this environment has conditioned the effects which entre­
preneurial behaviour can have, both in terms of the structure of profitability 
which i t has created and in the form of class structure which it has encouraged. 
The underdevelopment of entrepreneurship can, therefore, be attributed 
mainly to the nature of the economic, social and political obstacles which 
this environment has created. I t is in the nature of this environment and in 
how it has determined the overall possibilities for the emergence of entre­
preneurs, that explanations of the rate at which entrepreneurs emerge, and 
how they perform, are to be found. 
I I THE ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE OUTLINED 
The Overall Framework 
To begin with we must look at the question of entrepreneurial activity 
and at what kind of behaviour constitutes this activity. For this, it is useful 
to turn to the ideas of Easterbrook (1966). For him, there is little point in 
the study of entrepreneurship in making reference to the motivation and 
characteristics of individuals. The key to understanding entrepreneurial 
activity lies not in the personalities of individual entrepreneurs but in the 
nature of the uncertainties encountered in the investment process. I t is a 
society's structure of economic opportunities, as reflected in the scope 
for profitable participation in business activities, which lies at the root of 
the question of entrepreneurship.1 Thus, it is the way in which economic 
uncertainties are structured in a society that defines the overall opportunity 
for indigeneous entrepreneurship. The way these opportunities to realise 
profit are structured is to a large extent the result of economic and political 
history. 
Following Easterbrook the world can be divided into two types of area, 
each characterised by different forms of opportunity structure. These areas 
he calls "persistence" zones and "transformation" zones. In "persistence" 
zones, the return from investment generally, but especially in new enter­
prise, tends to be highly uncertain, with risks well above what he calls the 
risks encountered in "the ordinary conduct of business". The sources of the 
risks mentioned by Easterbrook are mainly political, in the form of internal 
tensions and the absence of institutional support for business in such societies. 
Other sources of risks arise from the difficulties in competing in the relevant 
markets with those long established industries with high levels of technology 
such as are found in transformation zones. In such circumstances, the invest­
ment that occurs in these zones tends to reinforce the existing pattern of 
investment as this is the only avenue to increased certainty of return. The 
minimum of risk is likely to occur in following traditional patterns of invest­
ment and the result is the perpetuation of a conservative pattern of develop­
ment. In this way the persistence of a large degree of uncertainty is sufficient 
to restrict the level and pattern of entrepreneurial activity. Steps may, of 
course, be taken to overcome (or to stabilise) the level of uncertainty. 
Easterbrook describes them. "These take the form of group actions involving 
the use of power in its general aspects, political, social and economic to pro­
mote or create the conditions in which investment may be made with pros­
pects of adequate return" (ibid. p. 62). Entrepreneurs may take non-economic 
forms of action, mainly political, to create the stability and security of 
1 Use of the notion of opportunity structures in this context emerged out of an attempt to develop 
the notion of opportunity structures found in the literature on occupational choice (see Roberts, 
1974) and to apply it to the choices of entrepreneurs. The ideas of Easterbrook are used here to 
describe, in a schematic fashion, the range of "choice structures" in which entrepreneurs operate. A 
somewhat similar use of opportunity structures has been developed by William Glade (1967). This is 
not, however, the source of its use here. 
expectations conducive to continuing investment and more importantly, 
continuing profit. Because of the nature of the class structure in many 
such parts of the world, such actions tend to be aimed at the stabilisation 
of the present structure of profitability rather than at its alteration. 
Persistence zones are to be found in colonial areas, in newly populated 
areas in underdeveloped areas generally. Here there are high risks attached 
to innovation and although power resources may be used to create more 
secure zones of investment, to create circumstances that increase the security 
of past investment and reduce the risks of future investment, this level of 
security is often difficult to achieve. 
In contrast to such areas are the transformation zones. Here a secure 
region for investment decisions exists and the risks attached to investment 
were at what Easterbrook calls a "normal commercial level". There is insti­
tutional support, both legal and political, for investment and the societies 
concerned are relatively free of internal tensions. There is sufficient security 
of return to make innovatory investment a profitable venture, to make 
investments in new activities which can transform the whole structure. 
Britain at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution was one such area. 
Hobsbawn (1969, p. 30) says Britain at that time "existed in conditions 
in which the promise of greater profit was the spur of innovation; i t was the 
promise of these greater profits which made Industrial Revolution not only 
practicable for its entrepreneurs but sometimes virtually compulsory". 
I t follows from this distinction that the level of entrepreneurship will 
differ in the two zones. I t is in persistence zones that the apparent lack 
of entrepreneurial activity is held to constitute a serious problem. The 
problem of development will be then to establish conditions within this 
zone which alter the structure of uncertainty, that is, to provide a new 
structure of economic opportunities in which the level of uncertainty is. 
reduced and the level of profitability is correspondingly increased. I f the 
structure of profitability remains unchanged, we have the situation which 
Carter identified in seventeenth century Highland Scotland. Here the failure 
of landlords to innovate with new methods of agriculture was put down to 
a lack of entrepreneurship and as an economically irrational decision made 
on social rather than economic grounds. But when the element of uncer­
tainty is introduced their behaviour appears in a different light. In a situation 
where cattle trading was giving them large profits and where new methods 
would have required, in Carter's words (1973, p. 299), "heavy capital 
outlay for uncertain economic return", their behaviour can be seen as rational 
economic behaviour. 
This view of entrepreneurial activity stands in contradistinction to other 
theories of entrepreneurship, which, while they accept that the entrepre­
neurial activity is risk-taking to realise profit, fail to examine the contexts in 
which risk-taking decisions are made.2 In effect, they expect the entrepreneur 
to play Russian roulette with a fully loaded revolver. In the perspective out­
lined here the entrepreneur is one who invests in a business venture to make 
a profit. Whether such investment is socially and economically innovatory or 
not will depend on the, nature of the situation in which the investment is 
made. 
It follows from this that political and economic changes which lead to 
changes in a society's structure of economic opportunities have an effect on 
the level of entrepreneurship. This effect can be illustrated with the cases of 
Pakistan and the Philippines. Here changes in the economic climate increased 
the total volume of feasible investment opportunities. They lessened the 
uncertainty attached to new investment in persistence zones and, through 
this, increased the level of entrepreneurial activity. The case of Pakistan is 
particularly striking. In a twelve-year period from 1947 to 1959 it developed 
an active indigenous entrepreneurial group and this, Papanek explains, was 
due to changes in its economic environment (Papanek, 1962). 
In 1947, Pakistan could be described as a persistence zone. There was 
little industry and its contribution to national income was very small. Yet 
by 1959 this contribution had risen from 1 per cent to 6 per cent. Industrial 
assets had increased nine-fold and value added more than ten-fold. These 
increases did not represent short-term speculative investments. Twenty per 
cent was in long term capital-intensive and high technology industries, such 
as chemicals, paper products, cement products, machinery and transport 
equipment. This change was brought about mainly by the emergence of a 
group of Muslim entrepreneurs. Until 1947 they had been traders, but the 
Korean War boom, during which they made large profits in trading, com­
bined with Pakistan's political independence in the same year to present 
them with a new range of opportunities. 
The end of the Korean War boom resulted in a decline in export earnings 
and a shortage of certain imported products. This meant that competition 
from foreign enterprises was substantially reduced in the domestic market. 
In this way increased opportunities for profit were presented to native entre­
preneurs. These advantages were consolidated by the opportunities which 
opened up due to political independence and the separation from Indian 
industry which lead to an exodus of Hindu traders from Pakistan. In such 
circumstances, as Papanek puts i t , "almost every industrialist was guaranteed 
a profit, for imports offered little competition, domestic production was 
inadequate and those able to import machinery were subsidised by under-
2 Note in particular how this use differs from the classic formulat ion of Schumpeter ( 1 9 5 9 ) . F o r h i m 
if entrepreneurs do what they are supposed to do, development wi l l follow. I n the argument here 
what entrepreneurs are supposed to do is make a profit. Whatever development follows from this 
depends on the context in w h i c h they pursue their profits. 
valued foreign exchange" (ibid, p. 50). These favourable circumstances were 
further encouraged by a government policy which guaranteed investment. 
As a result, the Muslim entrepreneurs left trade and moved into manufacturing 
industry. An important point here is that these entrepreneurs were economic 
innovators and not social ones. There is no evidence of any change in their 
motivations, social values and religious traditions. For example, their attitudes 
towards education and the role of woman remained as traditionally Islamic 
as ever. For Papanek " i t is difficult to interpret what happened in Pakistan 
in terms of a slow fundamental change in motivation, or in ideology or in 
custom which then caused alteration in economic behaviour". "The most 
obvious change that took place in 1947 was in the economic opportunity" 
(op. cit., pp. 54-55). And these new opportunities were effective in creating 
entrepreneurial activity. 
A similar case can be made for the increase in the number of entrepreneurs 
in the Philippines. Here Carroll (1965) has attributed this to changes in the 
climate of entrepreneurship and in particular to government policies of 
1950-1960 which, through a series of measures, reduced the uncertainty of 
entrepreneurial activity. With a reduction in uncertainty went an increase in 
the number of active entrepreneurs. These two examples suggest that the 
economic and political environment exerts an independent and decisive 
influence on the determination of the volume of entrepreneurship in that 
entrepreneurs either pursue a conservative line of investment in persistence 
zones or else simply do not invest at all. 
However, it is overly simplistic to move from this to an explanation of the 
emergence of entrepreneurs entirely in terms of changes in economic incen­
tives, such changes being determinable by government policy. After all, such 
incentives may either be unsuccessful or not offered at all. The reasons for 
this must be sought in the nature of the social structure which tends to 
become established in persistence areas. We can illustrate this with the 
examples of Chile and of Nigeria. 
First Nigeria. Here the period 1946-1966 was marked by government 
attempts to set up a development plan to capitalise on the post-war boom 
and either to guarantee or to cut the risks of investment (Akeredolu-Ale, 
1975). This was done using the full range of policies available — lending 
facilities, partnerships with private investors, industrial incentives, tax 
holidays, accelerated depreciation allowances and protective import duties. 
These changes occurred alongside an increase in the urban population which 
increased the size of the domestic market. There was, admittedly, unemploy­
ment in the cities. This meant that actual demand was below potential 
demand. But meeting actual demand could help increase employment and 
hence bring actual and potential demand into line. Here then was an environ­
ment in which a private sector could flourish and an environment which 
increased the overall volume of economic opportunities. Yet while such 
changes produced native entrepreneurs in both Pakistan and the Philippines, 
they did not have the same effect in Nigeria. The critical difference, however, 
lies in the dependent state of the Nigerian economy and its control by foreign 
companies. The post-war boom was pre-empted by foreign companies. A 
substantial native capitalist class could not emerge from this boom with 
accumulated resources and ready for entrepreneurial activity. The dominance 
of foreign companies meant they could (and did) take most of the new 
opportunities which emerged. This dominance was accompanied by the 
policies of such firms to keep natives out. They were always in a structural 
position to take more, controlling as they did most private entrepreneurial 
resources including commercial credit. The result, in Akeredolu-Ale's words, 
was "a progressive pre-emption of spheres of enterprise" (op. cit., p. 58). 
This could have been curtailed by aggressive government policies but in a 
country dominated by a foreign capitalist class and their local representatives 
their interests tended to find reflection in government policies. Thus, there 
was no serious attempt by the government to protect native industry. Even 
when an independent Nigerian government was set up, its nationalism was of 
a purely political nature and this was reflected in an open-economy policy. 
So, as a result of such factors, the foreign sector remained dominant and 
indeed increased, due to the addition of new foreign manufacturing com­
panies who came in response to government incentives. At the end of 1966, 
the manufacturing sector was in the control of non-Nigerian firms and these 
were concentrated in the most profitable sector of the economy. 
Thus, in Nigeria, the dependency relationship between international 
monopoly capital and the native economy has led to a structural constraint 
on the possibility of the emergence of indigenous entrepreneurs. This con­
straint is rooted in the country's economic and political history and it is at 
this macro-level that the apparent shortage of entrepreneurs must be con­
sidered and not at an individual or micro-level of social relationships. This 
point can be substantiated with the example of pre-Allende Chile. Here we 
draw on Frank's (1972) account. He begins with the expansion of mercantile 
capitalism into Latin America in general and Chile in particular and the 
situation of dependency created by this expansion. This resulted in a particular 
type of class structure which has conditioned all subsequent attempts to 
develop native entrepreneurship. The production of gold gave rise to a 
resident commercial and productive bourgeoisie who directed this production 
and shared its benefits with the colonial bourgeoisie. Being a dependent 
bourgeoisie, relying on an external economic power for their social position, 
they remitted their profits back to the mainland where they were used in 
metropolitan development. What profits they retained could have provided 
a source of capital to finance national development, but the colonial structure 
had created high profitability for exports and an unequal distribution of 
income which made production for the home market unrewarding. They 
reacted to this situation in a true entrepreneurial fashion, seeking high profits 
with low risks, by using the surplus for reinvestment to expand export 
potential or to import capital goods for the same purpose. Thus, their invest­
ment strategy, while realising profits for themselves, on a material level 
merely increased the strength of the foreign economic forces which were 
expropriating national resources on a large scale for their own development. 
Thus, Frank says, "this bourgeoisie made the development of underdevelop­
ment in Latin America into a self reinforcing part of the historical process". 
"This colonial structure", he continues (ibid, p. 23), "with some temporal 
and local exceptions, has persisted until today" (see also Pike, 1968 and 
Johnson, 1972). 3 
This dependent bourgeoisie has been in a position to ensure that govern­
ment policies have been in their favour and thus, unlike Pakistan and the 
Philippines where the government were prepared to protect native interests 
against foreign capital, the Chilean bourgeoisie were able to prevent this 
occurring. Thus, in 1850-60 the bourgeoisie saw its interests being challenged 
by nationalist interests in the interior of Chile who forced the government 
to impose protective tariffs. Native industry flourished briefly. These tariffs, 
however, were to the detriment of the import/export interests and, to 
protect them, the dependent bourgeoisie were prepared to fight, and to win, 
civil wars against these nationalist groups. In this they had the active support 
of metropolitan powers. The emergence of imperialism and the increased 
demand for raw materials consolidated the power of the dependent bour­
geoisie. They responded to the increased profitability for the export of raw 
materials by massive investment in infrastructure to increase the speed and 
efficiency of export behaviour. In Chile, as in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, 
it was native capital which built the railroads. The pattern of railroad con­
struction shows the clear link with the export trade in that they all come 
together in the giant railway stations of the export ports. The net result of 
such events was to consolidate the class structure created by mercantile 
capitalism. 
3 F r a n k is prepared to al low for minor changes in this structure. One such change occurred in the 
inter-war period w h e n dependency relations were weakened by the breakdown of world trade. I n 
these c ircumstances there was a shift of the balance of power as between industrial and agricultural 
elites wi th the result that domest ic industry increased in importance. However when the war ended 
dependency relations were re-established and domestic industry decl ined. Other writers (for example 
Cardoso and Falet to , 1979) would not be prepared to accept the persistence of the colonial structure 
in the form suggested by F r a n k . Cardoso (1972) has argued that a change in the structure of economic 
opportunit ies created by mult i -nat ional companies has altered the environment for entrepreneurs in 
m a n y L a t i n A m e r i c a n countries in the 1950s and 1960s. T h i s argument is consistent with the per­
spective outl ined in this paper. 
Thus, it is this class structure which maintains the particular structure of 
profitability which exists and, in doing so, restricts or prevents, with the aid 
of the metropolitan powers, any attempt to restructure it in ways which 
might encourage the emergence of a nationally-oriented entrepreneurial 
class. It is in this fashion that the existing economic and social structure 
tends to endure, and be made more enduring, in persistence zones. It is such 
factors which must be considered in the study of entrepreneurship in such 
areas. 
In summary then, the argument of this section is that the emergence of 
entrepreneurial behaviour must be considered as a function of the surround­
ing social structure, a structure which has been shaped by the economic and 
political history of the particular society under examination. Such behaviour 
can only be altered by changes in this structure, and especially in the eco­
nomic element of i t , which lower the degree of uncertainty attached to 
investment in what Easterbrook has termed "persistence zones". 
More Specific Influences 
The perspective outlined above tends to underplay the role of values, 
personality types and other more traditional elements in the study of entre­
preneurship. However, it does not altogether dismiss them. It stresses that 
analysis must start at the macro-level, in the framework of a country's 
political and economic history and in how this has structured the oppor­
tunities for entrepreneurship. But while such opportunities may well be 
structured by historical factors, not all of those in a position to avail of such 
opportunities do so. Some respond positively while others, who perhaps 
could, either do not respond or else respond inadequately. Not all of the 
shortfall in entrepreneurship is therefore explicable in terms of economic 
and political history. 
It is at this point that there is a need to mobilise other factors in explain­
ing the variety of responses. I t is here that sociological analysis must move 
to the level of social values, psychological characteristics and that other 
aspects of individuals, social groups and business enterprises become appro­
priate. 4 The problem at this level is to delineate the particular variables 
which might explain these differential responses, a problem which is com­
pounded by the unsystematic nature of much of the research in this area. 
Three strong contenders in previous work have been the roles of the 
extended family, of social approval and of social status in suppressing the 
entrepreneurial inclinations of large groups of people. We shall deal with 
social approval first. For many writers, and particularly those at the Harvard 
4 In his analysis of Nigerian entrepreneurship Akeredolu-Ale (1975, pp. 20-34) also suggests the need 
for a similar level of analysis but, at this level, he gives importance to a different set of values. 
Research Centre in Entrepreneurial History, the degree of social approval 
which entrepreneurial activity receives will decisively influence the extent of 
response to entrepreneurial opportunities (Aitken, 1965). Their theoretical 
formula is simply that the degree of social approval affects the quantity and 
quality of entrepreneurship. However, much of the empirical evidence does 
not really support this proposition. Take one of Gerschenkron's (1966) 
examples — Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century. Here former 
serfs and sons of serfs engaged in large-scale entrepreneurial activities including 
the construction of the merchant fleet on the Volga River. There was little 
doubt that these activities were at variance with the dominant values. Yet 
despite this, they continued unhindered. Large fortunes were made and 
many entrepreneurial innovations successfully launched. For Gerschenkron, 
the effect of anti-entrepreneurial values was not to suppress entrepreneursihip 
and industrialisation but to compress them into periods of rapid growth. 
"Perhaps", as he says, "the generalisation may be ventured that adverse 
social attitudes towards entrepreneurs do not sufficiently affect the process 
of industrialisation unless they are allowed to become crystallised into 
government action" (op. cit., p. 71). Given the world-wide political commit­
ment to industrialisation and development, the latter possibility is becoming 
increasingly unlikely. 
I f the degree of social approval appears to be an unlikely contender for 
explaining differential responses, the position is somewhat similar with the 
extended family. Traditionally this has been seen as a barrier to entrepreneur-
ship in that it is held to dampen incentive, discourage risk-taking and impede 
capital mobilisation. 5 The expectation that all profit earned, but unequally 
worked for, will have to be distributed in line with the kinship obligations, 
is held to be sufficient to prevent most from trying to realise such profits. 
However, some recent evidence suggests that whilst the extended family has 
negative effects on entrepreneurship, its positive effects may in fact outweigh 
them- The extended family can provide conditions which appear to facilitate 
the training of the entrepreneur and the establishment of the business firm. 
These conditions include the inter-relationships provided by the marriage 
networks of the family, which can provide either the capital or access to the 
credit facilities to launch an entrepreneurial career. This has been shown to 
be true of India (Javillamar and Peters, 1973; Medhora, 1965), Nigeria 
(Nafziger, 1969) and Lebanon (Khalof and Shwari, 1966). 
And finally the question of social status. This is closely related to the 
question of social approval in that it suggests that if society accords a low 
status to the role of entrepreneur, it will generate a tendency for businessmen 
5 T h i s point is made in the standard textbooks , namely Higgins (1968 , pp. 255-256) and Kindleberger 
( 1 9 7 2 , pp . 21-22) . 
to seek after socially valued attributes to the neglect of their entrepreneurial 
role. Thus, the difference in growth rates between Belfast and Dublin in the 
nineteenth century has been explained in these terms (Lee, 1973, pp. 14-19). 6 
The rapid growth of Belfast has been attributed to brilliant entrepreneurship 
while the slow growth of Dublin is seen as due to the pervasiveness of a con­
cern with social status which led to a tendency to leave business as soon as 
possible for more socially prestigious pursuits. But while such views may be 
partially correct, they fail to recognise that the maximisation of profit may 
well act as a means to the other ends which motivate entrepreneurs, such as 
an interest in placing their families in leading positions in a growing com­
munity. Thus, in that sense, the concern for social status may not interfere 
with entrepreneurship as an activity. I t merely suggests to what use entre­
preneurs may put the rewards of their activity. 
I f these three variables are not, therefore, of such great importance in 
explaining the differential responses to entrepreneurial opportunities, where 
must we look for more suitable candidates? Evidence from studies in develop­
ing countries shows that the area where entrepreneurial performance appears 
to be most satisfactory and where ability appears to be differentially distri­
buted is in the area of management. I t is shortcomings in this area which, we 
contend, hinder an adequate response to economic opportunities. I t is to 
such factors that we must look to assess differential performance.7 
I t is of central importance, as we shall see below, to stress managerial 
shortcomings but it is also necessary to separate entrepreneurship from 
management. An entrepreneur is someone who invests in a business venture 
to make a profit. As such he can either supply the managerial skills himself 
or else purchase them in the society. His inability to purchase such skills or 
the poor quality of the available "product" will be an obvious limitation on 
his entrepreneurial performance. 
The impact of management has been established in many underdeveloped 
areas. For example, Kilby (1971) investigating the baking industry in Nigeria, 
was able to attribute the loss of three-quarters of the potential profits to 
managerial defects in the form of raw material wastage, damage on production 
runs and widespread pilferage by workers. Similarly, a study of the Brazilian 
textile industry by the United Nations showed that the average operational 
efficiency of firms was only about 50 per cent of that which was potentially 
obtainable. Two-thirds of this difference was the result of managerial short­
comings. Other examples of these shortcomings are shown for Puerto Rico 
and Mexico by Strassman and for Latin America generally by Hirschman 
6 For an alternative analysis, see O'Malley (1981). 
7 This section of the paper is based on ideas put forward in P. Kilby, "Hunting the Heffalump", in 
P. Kilby (ed.), 1971. 
(cited in Kilby, op. cit.). This problem remains in Kilby's words, "a crippling 
bottleneck to industrialisation based on indigenous entrepreneurial resources" 
(Kilby, op. cit., p. 31). 
Kilby goes on to specify these managerial deficiencies in greater detail. 
They include the inability to match supplies of raw materials with the 
requirements of production, inadequacy of plant maintenance, the inability 
to use accounting systems as an aid to better management and the general 
wastage and misallocation of resources. These defects result in the failure 
either to perceive, or to act quickly upon, profitable opportunities. He has 
suggested four possible levels at which these managerial problems may be 
rooted. The first three levels conceive the problem as one which, however 
deeply it is rooted, can be solved by investment in appropriate training 
facilities. A properly organised educational programme would solve them. 
There is, however, one obvious objection to such a solution, an objection 
which Kilby fails to recognise. This objection is similar to the one which has 
been made to Lipset's (1967) suggestion that the expansion of the Latin 
American University system would lead to greater emphasis on achievement 
and in this way it would promote economic development. As Rhodes (1968) 
says, this is at best a secondary issue. I f Latin America was capable of 
mobilising the resources to expand the university system or to provide jobs 
for the graduates of that system, the problem of achievement motivation 
would hardly be central. Similarly, i f an underdeveloped country was capable 
of organising and running an efficient and effective technical education, 
managerial deficiencies are unlikely to be a shortcoming in such a society. 
It is at Kilby's fourth level that the problem can be most productively 
investigated. This suggests that these managerial weaknesses are the result of 
a society's past experience of managerial roles, and such weaknesses can take 
two different forms. They can materialise as problems either of role discon­
tinuity or of role incongruency. Let us examine role discontinuity first. In a 
society where similar managerial-style activities existed in the past, socialisa­
tion ensures that the required skills are transmtited from one generation to 
another. In such a society managerial shortcomings are likely to be minimal. 
However, when there are what Kilby calls "no transmutable antecedent 
roles" (Kilby, op. cit . ,p. 37), we wil l find considerable managerial weaknesses 
especially in the co-ordination and control aspects of the managerial role. 
These latter aspects are central to the efficient running of a modern industrial 
enterprise. 
The problem of role discontinuity did not arise for example in Britain in 
the Industrial Revolution. Revolution is, in fact, a misnomer for, as Wilson 
puts it (1957, p. 142), "abrupt change was not characteristic of the economic 
process, certainly not in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. The new 
industrial changes linked organically and personally with an older economic 
world at every stage". In terms of the managerial roles, there were, as Pollard 
points out, strong antecedent traditions of management (Pollard, 1965, p. 18). 
And even with the advantages of such traditions, it was still the beginning 
of the nineteenth century before an adequate level of managerial efficiency 
was established. I f a society like Britain had such large management problems, 
the situation of a society which is marked by low role differentiation will be 
so much worse. There will be huge problems of role discontinuity, problems 
which will be magnified if new technology is introduced. This technology 
will require an extensive division of labour and therefore a higher degree of 
managerial supervision. I f such a technology is introduced into a company 
which has already serious managerial defects, these weaknesses can only 
become more obvious. 
However, not all developing societies are characterised by such low levels 
of role differentiation. Some have high structural differentiation and here 
the problem of role discontinuity may not be so prevalent. The problem may 
in fact be of a slightly different nature — namely that of role incongruency. 
The managerial roles currently existing in such societies may be unsuitable 
or inappropriate to a business organisation which uses a new form of tech­
nology or attempts to break into new markets. Thus, a firm which presently 
operates with small scale production and has a managerial structure appropriate 
to this technology, may have the desire to respond to new market oppor­
tunities. But if these opportunities involve a movement to a mass production 
technology, it may experience considerable managerial difficulties in making 
such a change, difficulties which will inhibit the adequacy of its response to 
the new opportunities. 
The argument being put forward in this section accepts that the economic 
and political history of a country structures the opportunities for the emer­
gence of entrepreneurs and for the direction which their activities will take. 
However, it seeks to complement this perspective by looking for the factors 
which might explain why there is a differential response to such opportunities. 
Three inhibiting factors — the degree of social approval of entrepreneurial 
activities, the role of the extended family, and social status — are discussed 
but their importance is judged to be over-stated. Instead, we suggest that the 
differential distribution of managerial competence, both between societies 
and between potential entrepreneurial groups within a particular society, 
may well be the crucial factor. This, we argue, can best be examined by 
looking at the degree of role continuity and role congruence between old 
and new managerial roles. Thus, a perspective on entrepreneurship which 
remains at a macro-level and which fails to complete the picture with the 
above kind of considerations, remains necessarily incomplete. 
IV SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The argument of this essay has been that the factors which bring into 
being large numbers of entrepreneurs are located primarily at the level oi? a 
country's political and economic history, as is the direction which their 
activities take. As such it departs from the more conventional and much 
criticised psychological approach to the study of entrepreneurship. Instead 
it suggests that entrepreneurship be seen as the response of social groups to 
opportunities for economic gain and it stresses that such opportunities are 
structured by the particular history of the society under examination. I t 
futher suggests that while such opportunities are so structured, analysis of 
entrepreneurship must also proceed to the question of why there might be 
differential response in a society to such opportunities. This question, it is 
felt, might be best approached through a perspective which focuses on the 
degree of role continuity and role congruity between previous economic 
roles in a society and those required for an efficient and effective response 
to new entrepreneurial opportunities. For an adequate theory of entre­
preneurship, a detailed consideration of both these levels is essential. 
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